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COURTSIDE
BY PAUL M. SMITH, KATHERINE A. FALLOW, DANIEL MACH, AND AARON A. BRUHL

As sometimes happens, the most dramatic
development at the Supreme Court for
First Amendment lawyers in recent
weeks probably was the denial of review
in reporter's privilege cases arising
from the disclosure of the identity of
Valerie Plame as a CIA operative-an
action that resulted in the jailing of one
prominent journalist.

Miller v. United States;
Cooper v. United States
Turning away a request to rule on the
viability of a federal reporter's privilege,
the Supreme Court on June 27, 2005,
denied certiorari in Miller v. United
States, No. 04-1507, and Cooper v.
United States, No. 05-1508. The petitioners-New York Times reporter Judith
Miller, Time magazine reporter Matthew
Cooper, and Time's corporate publisher-had been held in contempt of court
for refusing to disclose the identities of
their confidential sources.
The case arose in the wake of
President George W. Bush's statement,
during the 2003 State of the Union
address, that British intelligence had
learned that Iraq had sought uranium
from Africa. In July 2003, amid public
controversy over the justification for the
war in Iraq, former Ambassador Joseph
Wilson published an op-ed reporting
that in 2002 he had been dispatched to
Niger to investigate the matter and had
found no credible evidence of such
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efforts. Shortly thereafter, columnist
Robert Novak wrote a piece revealing
that "senior administration officials"
told him that Wilson had been sent to
Iraq on the recommendation of his wife,
Valerie Plame, a CIA "operative." Critics
of the Bush administration alleged that
White House officials leaked the information in order to retaliate against
Wilson. The Department of Justice began
an investigation into whether administration officials had violated a federal law
prohibiting disclosing the identity of a
covert agent.
The special counsel heading the
investigation opened a grand jury inquiry
and subpoenaed several reporters in an
effort to determine the source of the
leak. Miller, Cooper, and Time refused
to reveal their sources, claiming that
they enjoyed a privilege under the First
Amendment and federal common law.
The district court rejected those arguments and held the petitioners in contempt, with imposition of sanctions
stayed pending the completion of appellate proceedings. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit (Judges Sentelle, Henderson,
and Tatel) affirmed the judgment. The
court held that Branzburg v. Hayes'
foreclosed the First Amendment argument. The court split three different
ways on the common law argument but
concluded that, if such a privilege existed at all, the government had made a
sufficient showing to overcome it.
The petitions for certiorari argued
that the lower courts are in disarray in
their interpretations of Branzburg and in
their rulings on the reporter's privilege.
The petitions urged the Court to recognize a common law privilege under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and to
clarify or revisit the holding in Branzburg.
The petitions also renewed the argument, rejected below, that the contempt
proceedings violated due process
because the courts relied on evidence to
which the petitioners never had been
given access. The petitioners were supported by amicus briefs from dozens of
major media and journalists' entities,

a libertarian advocacy group, and the
attorneys general of thirty-four states and
the District of Columbia. The brief of the
attorneys general in support of certiorari
was particularly striking in arguing that
the absence of a federal privilege frustrated state policies because all of those
states (in addition to almost every other
state in the country) recognize some form
of reporter's privilege.
The Supreme Court, however,
declined to accept review. (Justice
Breyer did not participate in the decision
to deny certiorari.) Shortly thereafter,
Miller was sent to jail in Alexandria,
Virginia; Cooper testified before the
grand jury after receiving a direct waiver
from his source, Karl Rove; and Time
released Cooper's notes to the special
counsel. The future and scope of the
federal reporter's privilege continues to
be uncertain, thus prompting renewed
efforts to enact federal legislation that
will afford protection to journalists similar to that given by forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass 'n
In one of the few merits cases last
Term involving the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech, the
Supreme Court in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, Nos. 03-1164 and
03-1165, reversed a lower court decision that had invalidated a federal program arranging for a beef promotional
campaign funded via a mandatory
assessment on all beef producers and
importers. The Eighth Circuit, relying
on the Supreme Court's prior decision
in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 2
had held that this mandatory assessment
of fees to fund commercial speech on
behalf of the beef industry constituted
a form of coerced speech violating the
First Amendment. The United Foods
case, which barred a mandatory assessment to fund mushroom advertising,
had in turn distinguished the earlier
decision of the Supreme Court in
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
Inc., 3 which upheld a mandatory assess-

Spring 2005 D Communications Lawyer D 23

ment on growers of California tree fruit
on the theory that the generic advertising at issue was part of a larger regulatory program that in effect collectivized
the operations of those growers.
In the Livestock Marketing case, the
Court for the first time addressed the
argument that these types of mandatory
assessments do not implicate First
Amendment concerns because the advertising at issue constitutes "government
speech" and the Constitution allows the
government to demand that the citizenry,
or some subset thereof, fund government
speech. (That issue had been raised in
United Foods but too late to be addressed by the Court.) In an opinion written
by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Thomas,
and Breyer, the Court accepted the argument that the advertising was really the
government speaking and thus the beef
producers who objected to funding it
lacked a valid constitutional claim.

"Government Speech"
Responding to the argument that the
Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and
Research Board Operating Committee
that actually receives the money and
arranges for the advertising is not the
government, the Court noted that its
activities were comprehensively controlled by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Half of the members are selected by the
Secretary and every word uttered in an
advertisement must be approved by the
Secretary. The Court also rejected the
argument that speech cannot be government speech if it is funded with a targeted assessment on beef producers. It
left for another day the argument that
specific advertising violates the First
Amendment if it states that the message
is being provided by beef producers,
rather than the government.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
result, rejecting the government speech
argument and maintaining her prior
position that this kind of program can
be treated as a permissible form of economic regulation of an industry.
Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Stevens and Justice Kennedy, dissented.
They relied primarily on the argument
that the government may not invoke the

government speech argument unless it
has revealed to the public its responsibility for the speech at issue-especially when the funding comes from a targeted assessment.

Rumsfeld v. FAIR
On November 29, 2005, the Supreme
Court will hear argument in Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights ("FAIR"), No. 04-1152, a challenge to a series of federal funding
restrictions collectively known as the
Solomon Amendment. The FAIR case
raises several core First Amendment
issues, including the contours of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
the delineation between speech and
conduct, and the constitutional limits
on government-compelled speech.
In its present form, the Solomon
Amendment denies federal funds to
any institution of higher education that
does not provide military recruiters
with access to its campus and students
on par with the access available to other
employers. The statute not only covers
funding from a wide variety of federal
agencies-including, among others, the
Departments of Defense, Labor, Health
and Human Services, Education,
Homeland Security, and Transportationbut also penalizes a parent university for
the actions of any of its "subelements,"
such as its law school. Consequently,
because the military's "don't ask, don't
tell" policy openly discriminates against
gays and lesbians, the Solomon Amendment presents schools with the choice of
either abandoning their long-standing
nondiscrimination policies, which cover
recruiting as well other core campus
activities, or foresaking hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funds.
A broad coalition of law schools,
professors, and students challenged the
Solomon Amendment, and in a two-toone decision the Third Circuit enjoined
enforcement of the law in November
2004. 4 As an initial matter, the Third
Circuit held that the law is properly
analyzed within the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, notwithstanding the
government's efforts to shield the funding condition from constitutional scrutiny. The court then concluded that the
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Solomon Amendment interferes with
the schools' constitutional rights in two
related ways. First, the Third Circuit
reasoned, the law dilutes the schools'
First Amendment right of associational
expression by requiring federally funded
schools not only to permit, but actually to
facilitate, activities the schools seek to
condemn. Second, the court of appeals
held, the Solomon Amendment effectuates a system of compelled speech, under
which law schools must affirmatively aid
military recruiters in disseminating their
message. Addressing the government's
asserted interest in seeking to raise and
support a military, the Third Circuit
deemed that interest to be a "vital" one,
but noted that the government had
offered "no evidence that would support
the necessity of requiring law schools to
provide the military with a forum for,
and assistance in, recruiting."5

Potential Reverberations
In the Supreme Court, the government
advances several arguments that, if
accepted, likely would reverberate well
beyond this case. For example, the government advocates a narrow view of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
under which the First Amendment limits
Congress's Spending Clause authority
only when a funding condition aims "at
the suppression of dangerous ideas"; all
other speech-related funding conditions,
the government argues, are wholly insulated from constitutional review. Under
the government's theory, if a funding
recipient objects to any given funding
restriction, the recipient's only recourse
is to decline the funds in question,
regardless of the amounts involved or
the relationship between the restriction
and the funding scheme in question.
In addition, the federal petitioners
challenge the basic premises underlying
respondents' expressive association
claim. Addressing the respondents'
asserted associational rights, the government invokes the Court's seminal
decision in United States v. O'Brien, 6
and argues that the schools' recruiting
functions and nondiscrimination policies simply are not expressive conduct
entitled to any constitutional protection.
If accepted on its terms, the government's

argument could effectively narrow the
class of conduct falling within the ambit
of the First Amendment.
Finally, the government is pressing
a limiting view of the compelled speech
doctrine. Building on the Court's recent
decision in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association7 (discussed
above), the federal defendants contend
that the doctrine is inapplicable to the
Solomon Amendment, because the
expression in question is "government
speech" and, therefore, entirely beyond
the purview of the First Amendment.
This case thus presents the Court with its
first opportunity to elaborate on newly
clarified "government speech" theory.
Whether the Court will accept the
government's invitation to reshape free
speech doctrine in the context of the
FAIR case, of course, remains unclear.
But given the complex, intersecting
First Amendment issues at play in
FAIR, the free speech bar undoubtedly
will follow the case with great interest.
Tory v. Cochran
On May 31, 2005, the United States
Supreme Court in Tory v. Cochran 8
vacated a broad injunction obtained by
famed lawyer Johnnie Cochran preventing a former client from picketing and
publicly speaking about Cochran, holding that the injunction lacked justification after Cochran's recent death and
was an unconstitutional restraint on the

client's First Amendment rights. The
Court did so, however, without passing
on the more significant First Amendment
questions presented by the case.
The case grew out of a successful
defamation action brought in California
by Cochran against Ulysses Tory. The
state trial court found that Tory had
engaged in an extended campaign of
unlawful defamatory activity, and further
that he had used such defamatory speech
in at attempt to coerce Cochran into paying him a monetary "tribute" to desist
from his activities. The court issued an
injunction preventing Tory and his associates from picketing Cochran's offices
and from making any oral statements
about Cochran in any public forum. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine "[w]hether a permanent
injunction as a remedy in a defamation
action, preventing all future speech about
an admitted public figure, violates the
First Amendment."
While the case was pending, and
after oral argument, Cochran died.
Counsel for Cochran and his widow,
who was substituted as respondent,
moved the Court to dismiss the case as
moot. In a seven-to-two opinion, the
Court vacated the judgment of the
California Court of Appeal. Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, first
held that the case did not become moot
upon Cochran's death. Noting that no

California law automatically invalidated
the injunction, and that Tory could not
know whether the injunction was void
until a court ruled on it, the Court
observed that the injunction continued
to restrain Tory's speech and therefore
presented an ongoing controversy.
But the Court went on to note that,
although it did not moot the case,
Cochran's death did make unnecessary
any consideration of "petitioners' basic
claims." "Rather," the Court explained,
"we need only point out that the injunction, as written, has lost its underlying
rationale," which was to prevent Tory
from coercing Cochran to pay him a
tribute. As a result, the injunction as
written became "an overly broad prior
restraint upon speech, lacking plausible
justification." Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, dissented, arguing that
the writ of certiorari should have been
dismissed as improvidently granted, and
criticizing the majority for "strain[ing]
to reach the merits of the injunction
after Cochran's death."
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